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Abstract
An early Hansen (1941, 1951) ignored the rate of interest as an equi-
librating variable, considered investment autonomous, and assumed the ad-
justment of saving to a fiscal deficit and autonomous investment to be
brought about solely by adjustment of output. Crowding-out was impossible.
The key to what happened in fiscal theory after Hansen is the government
budget constraint.
Once the rate of interest is admitted as an equilibrating variable it
might help accomplishing crowding-out. The extent to which it will, will
depend upon the way the fiscal deficit is financed—as expressed by the
government budget constraint. An IS-LM diagram is deployed to show the
difference between pure bond and pure money financing.
Once the rate of inflation is admitted as an equilibrating variable,
an IS-LM diagram becomes inapplicable for two reasons. First, having only
a single rate of interest it cannot accommodate the necessary distinction
between a nominal and a real rate of interest. Second, being static the
IS-LM diagram can accommodate neither the derivative with respect to time
implied by a definition of the rate of inflation nor the derivatives with
respect to time implied by a nonzero government budget constraint. Para-
doxically, however, full dynamization of Hansen (1941) had been accomplish-
ed by Samuelson (1939)— three years before Hansen's book was published.
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The key to what happened in fiscal theory after Hansen is the
government budget constraint. Ignoring the government interest bill
Hansen (1941, 1949, and 1951) thought of a fiscal deficit merely as the
money value of government purchase of goods and services minus govern-
ment net receipts. On the financing of it he said little but did
(1951: 231-236) report Lauderdale's views on debt retirement.
Lauderdale (1804) may have been the first to use a government budget
constraint but did so implicitly. So did Ohlin (1934). The first to
write an algebraic government budget constraint was probably the other
Hansen, Bent Hansen (1955: ch. III). Ott and Ott (1965) and Christ
(1967) were the first to show that a macroeconomic model becomes dynamic
once it incorporates the government budget constraint. As Hansen's had
done, their budget constraint failed to include the payment of interest
on government bonds. The complete constraint was offered by Blinder
and Solow (1974) and Turnovsky (1977). The government budget constraint
could then be written as follows.
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Define the fiscal deficit as the money value of government purchase
of goods and services plus the payment of interest on government bonds
minus government net receipts before interest paid by government, or
GP + iQ - R. Pure money financing of it would mean that the government
issued noninterest-bearing claims upon itself called money. Pure bond
financing of the deficit would mean that the government issued
interest-bearing claims upon itself called bonds and sold them to
households and firms. The general case should allow for both money and
bond financing, so we write the government budget constraint as
dM dQ
GP + iQ - R = + II (1)
dt dt
where
G = physical government purchase of goods and services
i = interest payment per annum per govenment bond
M = supply of money
P 5 price of goods and services
II = price of bonds
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Q S physical quantity of government bonds outstanding
R = government net receipts before interest paid by government
t = time
Writing such a government budget constraint had far-reaching con-
sequences that we must now set out.
2 . Tying Monetary and Fiscal Policy Together
A government budget constraint was a reminder that in a closed
economy, money and bonds could come into existence in no other way than
by financing a government budget deficit. Vice versa a government
budget deficit could be financed in no other way than by expanding the
money or bond supplies. Their rates of growth could indeed be con-
sidered the policy instruments of monetary and fiscal policy, respec-
tively. Such a choice of policy instruments would remind the reader of
the connection between monetary and fiscal policy: did the connection
reduce monetary policy to subservience to fiscal policy, then? Not
quite. Given the rates of growth of the money and bond supplies,
monetary policy might still take corrective action in two forms. By
open-market operations in already existing old bonds monetary policy
might readjust the money and bond supplies but always in a seesaw
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manner, i.e., always expanding one at the expense of the other. Also
by varying reserve ratios, monetary policy might make Federal Reserve
money go farther or shorter.
3. The Rate of Interest As an Equilibrating Variable: Crowding-Out
In early Hansen (1941, 1951) models the rate of interest was
ignored, and physical investment was autonomous, had no give in it, and
could not possibly be crowded out. In a system having only one equi-
librating variable, i.e., physical output, the adjustment of saving to
a fiscal deficit and autonomous investment had to be brought about by
adjustment of physical output alone.
Whatever the equilibrating variables are, in equilibrium they will
succeed in stopping all leakages. In an open economy, therefore,
saving plus import plus government net receipts must become equal to
investment plus export plus government purchase of goods and services.
A closed economy has neither import nor export. Here, then, saving
plus government net receipts must become equal to investment plus gov-
ernment purchase of goods and services or, which is the same thing,
saving must become equal to investment plus the fiscal deficit.
Consequently in a closed economy investment and saving will be equal
only if the government balances its budget. Under a fiscal deficit
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investment must fall short of saving, and a higher rate of interest
might help accomplishing such crowding-out.
The extent to which it will do so will depend upon the way the
budget deficit is financed. To see how, let us once again deploy the
Hicksian (1937) IS-LM diagram and consider pure bond and pure money
financing in turn.
4. Pure Bond Financing of a Fiscal Deficit
Let government expand its demand G but fail to raise taxes accord-
ingly. Pure bond financing of the resulting government deficit would
mean that the government issued interest-bearing claims upon itself
called bonds and sold them to households and firms. The money supply
would not be affected, and the LM curve would stay put: the economy
would still have to economize with the same quantity of money. But the
expanded government demand would have pushed the IS curve to the right:
at a given rate of interest, the aggregate demand C + I + G would be
up.
As IS curve pushed to the right would intersect an unchanged LM
curve in a point whose abscissa and ordinate were both higher than
before. The upper left-hand case of our figure 3 shows this result.
Output is up in order to satisfy the new government demand. The rate
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Figure V-3. IS-LM Analysis of Deficit Financing
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of interest is up. One effect is to discourage private investment—to
some extent government is being satisfied at the expense of private
investment. This is crowding-out. Another effect of the higher
interest rate is to induce households and firms to hold less cash, so
the larger output may be transacted.
5. Pure Money Financing of a Fiscal Deficit
Pure money financing of the government deficit would mean that the
government issued noninterest-bearing claims upon itself called money.
The money supply would be up and the LM curve pushed to the right.
Conceivably the money supply might expand enough to keep the rate of
interest from rising at all. In that extreme case there would be no
crowding out at all as shown in the upper right-hand case of figure 3.
6. Complete Crowding-Out: An Early Friedman View
The opposite extreme of complete crowding-out might be defined as
zero sensitivity of physical output to a bond-financed government defi-
cit. For such zero sensitivity to result, what would the LM curve
have to be like? If an IS curve pushed to the right must intersect an
LM curve in a point whose abscissa remains the same as before then the
LM curve must stay put and be vertical, as shown in the lower case of
figure 3. A vertical LM curve would mean that the demand for money is
insensitive to the rate of interest: no rise in the latter would
induce households and firms to hold less cash! No rise in the rate of
interest would release any money to transact a larger output! Such
complete insensitivity of the demand for money to the rate of interest
was in fact accepted by an early Friedman (1959) but abandoned by a
later one (1966, 1972) and was an extreme and very special case—as
extreme and special as the Keynesian opposite assumption of a complete
sensitivity of the demand for money to the rate of interest.
7. Intrinsic Nonlinearity
Early Hansen (1941, 1951) models were linear and could be, because
they ignored the rate of interest. A government budget constraint
called attention to the fact that under bond financing of its deficit
the government issued interest-bearing claims upon itself called bonds
and sold them to households and firms. The dollar proceeds of a new
bond issue would be price of bond times physical quantity of new bonds
issued, or HdQ/dt. Let the bonds be perpetuities whose market price is
a capitalization of their future interest payments. The market price
of a bond would then be in inverse proportion to the nominal rate of
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interest, would in other words have the nominal rate of interest in its
denominator hence make the system nonlinear.
8. A Weakness of the IS-LM Diagram
Including the rate of interest as an equilibrating variable imme-
diately raises the question: which rate of interest, the nominal or
the real one? Keynes knew, of course, but did not appreciate Fisher's
(1896) distinction between a nominal and a real rate of interest.
Keynes (1936: 222-229) did consider "own rates" of interest like a
wheat rate of interest, a copper rate of interest, and so on, and
discussed their carrying-cost and liquidity aspects. On pp. 142-143 he
discussed Fisher's version of such own rates but remained unconvinced.
Happily he and Hansen (1941, 1949, 1951, and 1953) begged the question
by simply ignoring inflation. In that and only that case the nominal
and the real rate of interest will coincide, and one may apply the
IS-LM diagram. Had there been inflation one would have encountered the
difficulty that the IS curve is a function of the real rate of interest,
while the LM curve is a function of the nominal one, and the IS-LM
diagram would become inapplicable.
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9. The Rate of Inflation As an Equilibrating Variable
One Hansen (1941, 1949, 1951, and 1953) ignored inflation but the
other Hansen, Bent Hansen (1955), did not and could not: his work was
a Swedish government assignment ordering him to examine how the value
of money could be stabilized at full employment. In the United States
Keynesians were slow to unfreeze price. In the cores of their fiscal-
policy models neither Blinder-Solow (1974) nor Tobin-Buiter (1976)
unfroze it, but Turnovsky (1977) did.
The rate of inflation is the growth rate of price and is defined as
dP 1
gp
= (2)
dt P
Once that rate was admitted as an equilibrating variable the IS-LM
diagram would have to be abandoned. First, an IS-LM diagram has the
single rate of interest r plotted on the vertical axis and physical
output X on the horizontal one hence cannot accommodate Fisher's
distinction between a nominal and a real rate of interest. Second, an
IS-LM diagram is static, hence cannot accommodate derivatives with
respect to time such as the definition (2). Still, although analyzing
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inflation, Friedman (1970) cried to do so within the framework of the
IS-LM diagram.
10. Intrinsic Dynamics: Short-Run and Long-Run
Paradoxically full dynamization of Hansen (1941) had been accom-
plished by Samuelson (1939) three years before the book, was published.
Intuitively Hansen saw, first, physical investment as the change in
desired physical capital stock or I(t) = S(t) - S(t - 1). Second,
Hansen saw desired physical capital stock in direct proportion to phy-
sical output of consumers' goods or S(t) = bC(t), where the factor of
proportionality b was the accelerator. Hansen could then work out the
arithmetic of an interaction between the multiplier and the accelerator,
Bewildered by the multitude of possibilities thus opening up he turned
to his brightest student for help. Ignoring taxes Samuelson (1939)
wrote out Hansen's system as the lagged consumption function
C(t) = cX(t - 1), (3)
the lagged investment function
I(t) = b[C(t) - C(t - 1)], (4)
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and the goods-market equilibrium condition
X(t) = C(t) + I(t) + G(t) (5)
where, in our own notation:
b = the accelerator
C = physical consumption
c = propensity to consume
G = physical government purchase of goods and services
I = physical investment
S = physical capital stock
t = time
X = physical output
Solving his system Samuelson found the second-order linear dif-
ference equation in physical output:
X(t) = (1 + b)cX(t - 1) - bcX(t - 2) + G(t) (6)
where G(t) was a constant. The characteristic equation corresponding
to (6) would be a quadratic. If its roots were complex, physical output
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would display oscillations but otherwise either converge to the multi-
plier 1/(1 - c) times the constant level of government purchase G(t)
or be growing smoothly.
Any model including lags or derivatives with respect to time is
dynamic. Our definition (2) included such a derivative. But a full
fiscal-policy model will have more of them. Because it includes deriv-
atives with respect to time, a nonzero government budget constraint
will remind the reader of what Turnovsky (1977) called its "intrinsic
dynamics": solutions will be time paths rather than equilibrium levels,
While dynamic, a full fiscal-policy model could remain short-run in
the sense that an attempt would be made neither to trace the effect of
investment upon physical capital stock, to use a production function
relating the flow of physical output to physical capital stock, nor to
optimize the latter. Blinder-Solow (1974) still made no such attempts,
but Turnovsky (1978, 1980) did and for good reasons.
Crowding-out raises two questions neither of which can be satis-
factorily dealt with by short-run dynamics. First, crowding-out must
work via some mechanism describing what desired investment is a func-
tion of. Desired investment must be the investment that will bring
actual physical capital stock into accordance with the desired one. So
a full fiscal-policy model must come to grips with the optimization of
physical capital stock hence use long-run dynamics.
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Second, once the crowding-out mechanism has been set out the con-
sequences for the rest of the economy must be found. Will the capital
coefficient be affected, and is the capital coefficient of any conse-
quence for the real wage rate? Such questions can be answered only
within the framework of growth theory, i.e., long-run dynamics, and we
are doing so in Faculty Working Paper #979, "Rational Expectations and
Policy Neutrality in a Friedman Inflation Equilibrium".
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